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The Judge as Politician: Review of 
In .Defense of a Political Court 
Terri Jennings Peretti 
Princeton University Press, Princeton: 1999. 
Reviewed by: Nicole Robichaud 
In the wake of the recent Marshall decision of the Supreme Court 
of Canada on aboriginal treaty rights, much media attention has been 
focused on the issue of what role the Court should play in Canadian 
govemance. The idea of an unelected group of judges deciding issues of 
national importance, and overturning decisions of the elected 
legislators, is one that has been debated in all Western democracies. In 
her new book Jn Dqfense ef a Political Court, Terri Jennings Peretti 
provides a challenging new perspective to the already vast body of 
American constitutional law theory. Although written in the context of 
the United States, the overall themes of the book are equally relevant to 
Canada's own debate. 
Peretti's thesis is that the U.S. Supreme Court is and should be a 
political court. She challenges the prevailing view that the Court must be 
apolitical and objective, deciding cases on the basis of overarching 
constitutional principles. Instead, Peretti argues that there is no objective 
meaning to the constitution that judges must interpret and apply. Rather, 
judges should and do decide according to their own political beliefs and 
values. She argues that this is consistent with democratic theory, and 
serves to enhance political representation. Checks and balances within 
the political and judicial system serve to ensure that the Court's views 
ultimately reflect those of the American public. Further, Peretti asse1is 
that the Court helps give voice to those interests that would otherwise be 
shut out of the political sphere, thereby contributing to and enhancing 
consensus-building in a pluralist democracy. Peretti's controversial 
argument is one that will certainly be rejected by some readers and 
academics. Nevertheless, this well written piece provides a compelling 
challenge to our traditional ways of thinking of the judiciary, and 
provides a valuable contribution to this ongoing constitutional debate. 
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The Argument 
In Part I, chapters one through three, Peretti canvasses the major 
schools of constitutional law theory. The first she addresses is what she 
terms the "neutralists" - the conventional theorists who believe that the 
constitution can and must be objectively interpreted and applied by 
judges. The second school is Critical Legal Studies, who perceive 
constitutional interpretation as inherently subjective. Finally, Peretti 
discusses the "Skeptics", those who also believe interpretation to be 
subjective, but who favour political checks on judicial power to remedy 
this subjectivity. The underlying assumption of all these schools of 
thought, argues Peretti, is that a political comi, one in which judges 
decide according to their personal political values, is undesirable and 
undemocratic. Peretti devotes Part II of the book to challenging this 
assumption. 
Part II begins with chapter four, in which Peretti argues that when 
justices decide according to their political values, they are in fact 
perfmming a political representation function. Justices are selected by 
elected officials largely based on their policy biases and by deciding 
according to these policy preferences, they are carrying out the will of 
the elected representatives who appointed them. Indirectly then, the 
justices serve to represent the political will of the people. Peretti goes on 
to canvass a host of empirical data to support her contention that justices 
are, in fact, selected largely based on their political views, and that they 
do, for the most paii, decide cases based on those views. 
In chapter five Peretti argues that policy-voting by judges also 
brings with it two other democratic benefits. Firstly, it activates and 
makes effective political checks on the Court, such as public opinion, 
technical legal constraints, political checks, and self-restraint. For 
example, in order to effectively carry out his/her policy preference, a 
justice must still obtain support of other justices on the court, and of 
politicians who have a variety of powers over the Court (e.g. 
impeachment, appointments, statutory reversals). Secondly, Peretti 
argues that a policy-motivated judge will anticipate and accommodate 
political opposition, thereby contributing to consensus-building in 
society. 
Chapter six addresses one of the main arguments of conventional 
constitutional scholars: that the Supreme Comi derives its legitimacy 
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from the notion that it is apolitical. These scholars have long asserted 
that public reverence for the court is a direct function of its perceived 
impartiality and objectivity. Drawing on empirical studies, Peretti 
contends that this argument is in error, and that Americans do not 
strongly revere the Court at all. Rather, there exists only limited public 
awareness of the Court. Further, support for the Court depends largely 
on support of the political values underlying its decisions. Legitimacy of 
the Court is therefore derived more from public suppori of its decisions, 
than it is from the notion that it is apolitical. 
In chapter seven, Peretti revisits democratic theory, and asserts that 
her view of the political court is consistent with democratic theory. She 
argues that conventional scholars are mistaken in two respects. Firstly, 
they overestimate the influence of majoritarian preferences on the 
political actors in government, and understate it on the judicial actors. 
Secondly, they view the American political system as majoritarian and 
legislative-centred, as opposed to pluralist. Peretti embraces the 
pluralist view of democracy, where consensus is built by giving voice to 
competing interests through a variety of non-hierarchical political 
institutions. A political court helps this system by providing another 
arena for these interests, some of which might otherwise go unheard. 
In her conclusion in chapter eight, Peretti reiterates her thesis that 
the comi needs to be political in its decisions. She further sets out four 
criteria that ensure that a political comi will function effectively: 1) a 
properly working selection process; 2) a Court that is honest about its 
policy making; 3) the availability of opportunities for the people and 
legislators to respond to the court; and 4) justices who possess the desire 
and ability to listen and respond. Through the application of these 
critieria the Court can serve a valuable political function in pluralist 
democracy. 
Critique 
Overall, Peretti's work is well written and argued. Although 
slightly repetitive at times, her argument is structured in a clearly 
organized and coherent manner. Her propositions are frequently 
supported by substantial empirical data. Further, her fluid writing style 
make the work easily accessible to both student and scholar. The 
biggest source of potential criticism and controversy will no doubt be 
the thesis of the work itself. Putting aside for a moment the 
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prescriptive aspect of her argument, however, it is difficult to disagree 
with the descriptive aspect of it: that personal policy preferences of 
judges underlie most judicial decisions. With the Supreme Comi of 
Canada, as with the U.S. Supreme Court, voting patterns on the comis 
frequently indicate the justices decide based on underlying political 
philosophies at least as much as on judicial reasoning. Peretti also has a 
strong argument in her assertion that laws and constitutions are capable 
of a variety of meanings which may change over time. These varying 
interpretations reflect different policy preferences, all of which are 
capable of justification through sound judicial reasoning. It is the 
prescriptive aspect of her argmnent that is the more controversial. 
Peretti' s notion that unelected judges should be able to decide 
based on their own political views flies in the face of the prevailing 
notion of the proper duty of the courts. As Peretti acknowledges, the 
fundamental underpinning of vi1iually all constitutional law theory is 
that the role of the Supreme Court justices is to objectively interpret the 
law and the constitution, putting aside any personal views or 
preferences. By casting this notion aside, Peretti puts into question 
almost all existing theories and justifications of our judicial system. At a 
minimum these justifications will have to be rethought if we are to 
accept her argument. 
To the extent that Peretti challenges most existing constitutional 
theory and celebrates the existing subjectivity of judicial reasoning, she 
may be ignoring the possibility that our cun-ent system functions as well 
as it does because it is premised as being apolitical. While Peretti asse1is 
that a political comi is not one in which judges decide arbitrarily or on 
emotion, if the notion of the political court were to become accepted, 
arguably decisions would increasingly be decided in just this fashion. It 
may be the fear of public reprisal for not appearing to be apolitical that 
causes the judiciary to follow public opinion and keep the arbitrariness 
of their decisions in check. If judges were to be given free rein to decide 
according to their own policy preferences, who is to say they would not 
staii ignoring public opinion and deciding cases based on their own 
whims? 
A further problem with Peretti' s argument relates to chapter five, in 
which she asserts that a variety of constraints ensure that the Court's 
views ultimately reflect those of the people. Here she seems to overstate 
the importance of both the fo1mal and informal checks on the comi. 
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With respect to the formal political checks, such as impeachment, 
constitutional amendment, and appointment, it seems doubtful that these 
are in reality as constraining as she seems to think. The first two are very 
rarely invoked, and while the appointment process in the United States 
is a highly politicized one, appointment of a conservative judge is no 
guarantee that they will continue to vote in a conservative manner for all 
decisions. Further, since judges are appointed for life, it is quite 
plausible the court could be composed of justices representing popular 
opinion of fifteen or twenty years ago, as opposed to that of today. In 
Canada, the argument is perhaps even weaker. Here judges are virtually 
never removed from office, and the appointment process is a closed one. 
With respect to the weight of public opinion on the court, Peretti 
asse1is that it plays a strong role, and that judges actively anticipate and 
accommodate opposition to their views. It is not clear that this is, in fact, 
the case. In Canada, recent Supreme Court and appellate decisions on 
native fishing rights and child pornography, both of which led to public 
outc1y rather than approval, would seem to suggest the opposite, that 
justices will ignore public opinion for the sake of legal principles. 
Another weakness in Peretti' s argument is in her assertion of the 
political comi's contribution to a pluralist democracy. In stating that the 
Court can give voice to groups that may otherwise be ignored by the 
political system, she seems to ignore the reality that for many groups the 
cost of taking a case to the Supreme Court is prohibitive. As a result, 
while some groups may have a better chance of being heard in the 
judicial arena than the legislative one, there are probably at least as 
many groups who have no hope of being heard by the judiciary. While 
they may also have no voice in the legislative sphere, they are at least 
able to have influence through the ballot box, if nothing else. 
Perhaps the most unsatisfying aspect of Peretti's argument, though, 
is in her conclusion. Having argued throughout that the court should be 
political and that all the previous theorists are in error, she fails to 
effectively take the next step to address the issue of where the judiciary, 
and constitutional theorists, should go from here. While she does set out 
criteria to ensure a political court works effectively (a properly working 
selection process; a Court that is honest about its policy making; the 
availability of opportunities for the people and legislators to respond to 
the court; and justices who possess the desire and ability to listen and 
respond) she does little to elaborate on this. She does not address 
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whether or not the appointment process should become more 
politicized, for example, and if so, what the implications are for 
otherwise strong candidates who may not feel comfortable entering a 
political arena. Further, if judges are to be more open about their 
political preferences, where does this leave the traditional method of 
legal reasoning? Are judges meant to just discuss the policy reasons why 
they prefer a particular outcome? And finally, what are the implications 
for lower court judges? Is only the Supreme Court to be a political court? 
If not, an individual litigant's fate could be determined by the political 
leanings of the lower court judge that just happens to be sitting on the 
case. 
In the end, however, Peretti's provocative and compellingly argued 
piece does provide a strong challenge to our traditional way of thinking 
about the role of the Supreme Court, both in Canada and the United 
States. While not without its weaknesses, Peretti' s argument is strong 
for at least openly acknowledging what many lawyers and scholars have 
known for years: judicial decisions are not rendered in a purely objective 
manner, and that judges' personal political views are frequently the real 
reasons for the outcome in any given case. This is certainly a good first 
step in coming up with a workable themy of the role of courts which 
does away with some of the naive idealism of traditional constitutional 
theory. Whether or not one agrees with Peretti that we should embrace 
this political court wholeheartedly, one cannot deny that her work 
provides a valuable contribution to the debate. 
